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1 Introduction 
Due to recent crisis of 2008 fiscal policy regained interest of policymakers and researchers. 
Because of housing bubble explosion, which started in 2007, monetary policy became 
ineffective due to liquidity trap, when the interest rate hit the lower possible bound. When the 
economy reaches the liquidity trap or investment trap conditions, expansionary fiscal policy 
viewed as recovery tool of policymakers. That made the world of economists to shift the 
interest in favor of fiscal policy analysis, in particular, the effectiveness of economy 
stimulation through increase in government expenditure. EERP is an example of the 
expansionary fiscal policy strategy implemented by Euro Area at the end of 2008. European 
Economic Recovery Plan aimed to provide short-term impulse to total demand in term of 
increase in GDP by 4% compared to no stimulation case.  However, the effectiveness of 
EERP prompt debate within the economists, since the economy did not show strong and 
sufficient improvements.  
As other European countries, in response to Great Recession, Norway in the second half of 
2008 increased its total government expenditures by 6.4% and increased the ratio of total 
government expenditures to GDP by 5.9% in 2009.  The response of Norwegian economy in 
terms of GDP growth was slow and inconsistent, falling in 2009 and returning to growth 
tendency beginning of 2012. Therefore, it is hard to see in what way the fiscal policy 
stimulation affected the economy. Moreover, since household`s consumption is the main 
component of the GDP, being 40.5% at the end of 2013, followed by fairly equal share of 
government spending and investment, 21.6% and 21.7% respectively. Having in mind, 
importance of household`s consumption for Norwegian economy, it is crucial to know how 
the fiscal policy can stimulate private consumption.  
Notwithstanding the fact of increased interest of researchers in the influence of government 
spending on private consumption and its effectiveness as tool to economy stabilization, both 
theory and empirical evidence does not provide obvious answers. Actually, various studies 
showed controversial results depending on the methods used for estimation methodology. 
Most of the papers employ: descriptive methodology with various estimation ways (Ramey 
and Shapiro, 1998; Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2003; Mountford and Uhlig, 2004; 
Coenen and Straub, 2009; Bouakez and Rebei, 2005; Gali, Valles and Lopez-Salido, 2007) 
and Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2002; 
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Fatas and Mihov, 2001; Bouakez and Rebei, 2005; Gali, Valles and Lopez-Salido, 2007) to 
estimate the relationship between government spending and private consumption. Most of the 
empirical studies, under VAR and descriptive methodology, estimated positive effect of 
government spending expansion on private consumption. 
 As well as empirical studies, theoretical frameworks, employing various assumptions, predict 
opposite results. The relationship between government spending and private consumption can 
be explained in terms of Keynesian, New Keynesian and neoclassical theories that generate 
completely opposite outcomes. Under the neoclassical theory and New Keynesian theories, 
government spending expansion will crow out private consumption through negative wealth 
effect dominance. However, Keynesian theory predicts increase in private consumption in 
response to government spending shock, which is called crowding in phenomena.  
In purpose to explain the crowding in phenomena, which is consistent with empirical 
findings, economists managed to derive positive response of private consumption to 
government spending shock by modifying standard RBC model and standard New Keynesian 
model. Bouakez and Rebei (2005) modified standard RBC model with assumptions of 
effective consumption, which allows government spending to enter households utility 
function, and habit formation to estimate crowding in effect. Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles 
(2007) developed the idea of Mankiw (2000) of rule of thumb consumers and extended 
standard New-Keynesian model with presence of non-Ricardian households in addition with 
price stickiness and deficit financing given imperfectly competitive labor market. Gali et al. 
(2007) successfully managed to show positive relationship between government sending 
shock and private consumption. 
This paper applies the modified RBC model to test the presence of crowding in effect in case 
of Norway. The analysis of effect of government spending on private consumption is divided 
on three levels: general government spending, central government spending and local 
government spending. Given subdivision will allow to see if expansionary fiscal policy is 
effective tool to stimulate household`s consumption on scale of whole country and local scale. 
As empirical estimation methodology, the paper employs ARDL model, which gained 
popularity recently and proved to be effective tool to estimate long run relationship. 
The rest of the paper organized as follows: Section 2 provides theoretical background to 
analyze the relationship of government spending and private consumption. Section 3 
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describes VAR methodology and it’s estimation. Section 4 introduces Bouzkez and Rebei 
modified model and estimates it using ARDL model. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Theoretical Background and 
Empirical Literature Review 
The effect of government spending on private consumption can be explained under several 
theoretical frameworks: neoclassical theory or Real Business Cycle model, Keynesian or IS-
LM model, and New Keynesian model; and each predicts opposite outcome. It is worth 
saying that each model shows positive effect of government spending on output and having 
consumption as significant part of output it is crucial to have clear understanding of 
consumption–government spending relationship. 
2.1 Empirical Literature Review 
Before turning to theoretical explanation of the effects of government spending on private 
consumption, review of empirical evidence would be useful. Empirical findings on the 
response of private consumption on increase in government spending do not speak with one 
voice and, depending on the methodology used, provides different results. While most of 
reviewed studies find positive response of private consumption to a government spending 
increase, the magnitude of the response is different. It vary from large, positive and 
significant (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2002; Fatas and Mihov, 2001; Linnemann, 
2006; Bouakez and Rebei, 2005; Gali, Valles and Lopez-Salido, 2007) to small and rather 
insignificant (Mountford and Uhlig, 2004; Coenen and Straub, 2009). In contrast, the analyses 
based on Ramey-Shapiro episode (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Burnside, Eichenbaum and 
Fisher, 2003), which is segregation periods of military spending shocks, show negative 
response of private consumption on government spending expansion. 
Principally the empirical analysis split up into two categories: descriptive methodology with 
various estimation ways and Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology. Majority of studies 
based on VAR estimates the same positive response of private consumption to increase in 
government spending (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2002; Fatas and Mihov, 2001; 
Bouakez and Rebei, 2005; Gali, Valles and Lopez-Salido, 2007). While descriptive 
methodology depends on estimation procedures and data set, thus shows diverse results, both 
possibility of crowding in and crowding out (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Burnside, 
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Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2003; Mountford and Uhlig, 2004; Coenen and Straub, 2009; 
Bouakez and Rebei, 2005; Gali, Valles and Lopez-Salido, 2007).  
As it comes to the effect of expansionary fiscal policy in terms of increase in government 
spending on outcome, the reviewed studies show the positive impact, the size of which 
depends on country. Further on, the respond of investment commonly in a negative manner 
(Bouakez and Rebei, 2005; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Coenen and Straub, 2009; 
Mountford and Uhlig, 2004), while other studies showed positive comovement between 
government spending and investments (Gali, Valles and Lopez-Salido, 2007; Burnside, 
Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2003; Fatas and Mihov, 2001). According to Gali et al. (2007), Fatas 
and Mihov (2001), and Bouakez and Rebei (2005) wage tends to grow with increase in 
government spending. As for hours worked, Fatas and Mihov (2001), and Bouakez and Rebei 
(2005) found negative effect, however Gali et al. pointed increase in hours worked starting at 
second quarter after shock. 
Overall, empirical evidence on the effects of government spending expansion is quiet various. 
Yet, the presence of crowding in effect is obvious and supported by the data. 
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2.2 Neoclassical Framework 
Standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model, under the framework of neoclassical theory, 
predicts reduction in private consumption in the response to an increase in government 
spending, which is known as crowding out effect. Baxter and King (1993) employed standard 
RBC model, assuming infinitely-lived Ricardian households, whose consumption decisions 
depends on intertemporal budget constraint, to analyze the effects of fiscal policy and showed 
that rise in government spending financed by lump-sum taxes will decrease households’ 
permanent income. Such an effect called negative wealth effect. Reacting to the increase in 
taxes, households tend to work more so increase labor supply, which is called substitution 
effect. Under the standard RBC model, substitution effect is not strong enough to cover 
negative wealth effect. As the result, private consumption decreases. 
Since empirical results mismatch with the outcomes of neoclassical theory, the use of 
standard RBC model in explaining positive response of private consumption to increase in 
government spending considered being besides the purpose. However, under specific 
modifications it is possible to generate crowding in effect using RBC model in terms of 
neoclassical framework.  
To explain nature of government spending crowding in private consumption, Linnemann 
(2006) adapted standard RBC model with nonadditively separable utility function 
specification. The necessary condition for this modification is intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution between consumption and leisure smaller than one (King, Plosser, and Rebelo, 
1988). Considering these specifications, increase in government spending reduces the private 
resources available to households, as the result, negative wealth effect arises, which reduces 
demand for leisure, meaning increase in employment. Under the assumption of nonadditively 
separable utility, leisure and consumption should be substitutes, while employment and 
consumption should be complements. Thus, expanded employment and working hours cause 
the marginal utility of consumption to increase. Depending how strong the degree of 
complementarity among consumption and employment, the response of private consumption, 
as well as output and working hours, to the government spending expansion will be positive.  
Bouakez and Rebei (2005) modified standard RBC model with assumptions of effective 
consumption, which allows government spending to enter households utility function, and 
habit formation that assumes dependence of utility function on current level of effective 
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consumption. Using data for the USA the positive effect of government spending on private 
consumption obtained with the necessary condition of Edgeworth complementarity among 
government spending and private consumption, under which increase in government spending 
increases the marginal utility of private consumption, providing additional stimulus for 
households to work more, thus offsetting negative wealth effect.  
Assumption of complementarity considered as one of essential tools to generate crowding in 
effect. Ganelli and Tervala (2009) employed the degree of complementarity as main tool of 
generating crowding in effect. Yet, the empirical studies of complementarity and 
substitutability between government spending and private consumption do not speak with one 
voice. Nieh and Ho (2006) checked 23 OECD countries for intertemporal and intratemporal 
substitution between government spending and private consumption and found Edgeworth-
Pareto complementarity between them. Guo-ping, Dong, Li-Zhen (2007) conducted panel 
cointegration analysis among different regions in China and estimated intertemporal and 
intratemporal substitution between government spending and private consumption. As the 
result, they found prevailing degree of complementarity in 20 out of 29 regions and very weak 
degree of substitution in 4 regions of China. On the other hand, Katsaitis (1987) estimated 
weak degree of substitution between government spending and private consumption in 
Canada. Strong degree of substitutability was estimated by Ni (1995). In addition, Chiu 
(2001) found strong presence of intratemporal substitution of public-private consumption in 
Taiwan. Following Chiu, Ho (2004) conducted estimation of intratemporal elasticity of 
substitution between government spending and private consumption and showed presence of 
weak crowding out effect in Japan. However, Karras (1994) conducted cross-country analysis 
and showed government spending and private consumption are rather complements than 
substitutes. 
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2.3 Keynesian Framework 
Traditional Keynesian theory or IS-LM model predicts crowding in effect that is an increase 
in private consumption in response to an increase in government spending. Difference 
between outcomes of neoclassical and Keynesian frameworks happens due to behavior of 
households. IS-LM considers non-Ricardian households, whose consumption depends on 
their disposable income allowing crowding in effect.  
Crowding in effect considered as a typical Keynesian feature, however, standard New 
Keynesian model predicts opposite result. According to Khun, Muysken, van Veen (2010) 
standard New Keynesian model with sticky prices considers rational forward-looking 
households who seek to maximize their intertemporal utility constrained not to disposable 
income as in traditional Keynesian theory, but to lifetime income.  
Notwithstanding, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) showed that empirically consumption seems 
to be contingent on disposable income in a greater extent that assumed by standard New 
Keynesian theory. Thereafter, Mankiw (2000) proposed a modification of the model that 
would allow diversity in the demand side, which includes two types of households: fully 
optimizing and forward-looking household, savers and simple rule of thumb households, 
spenders. Mankiw used data from the United States and justified the diversification of 
households. First, by studying consumption patterns of households, author estimated that 
consumption smoothing over lifetime is far from perfect and consumption relies on disposable 
income much greater than it is theoretically allowed. Second, Mankiw argues that large 
portion of households act in a rule of thumb manner and consume disposable income, so do 
not save and do not smooth consumption over periods. 
Further, Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004) developed the idea of Mankiw (2000) and 
extended standard New-Keynesian model with presence of non-Ricardian households in 
addition with price stickiness and deficit financing given imperfectly competitive labor 
market, which allows economy-wide union to set the wage. Assuming these features, Gali et 
al. demonstrated the model, where cooperation of two types of consumers with firms that 
rarely adjust prices and government that issues debt to fund part of its spending, is capable to 
generate positive effect of government spending on private consumption. Introduction of 
sticky prices assumption makes labor demand reaction stronger than the labor supply reaction 
and allows for real wages to rise even under the decreasing marginal product of labor. Under 
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assumption of imperfect labor competition increase in output results in a rise of profits and 
income. Given these features, the channel of crowding in phenomena is following: Having 
sticky prices, an increase in public spending leads to higher aggregate demand, as a response, 
firms react with expansion of demand for labor, which leads to an increase in real wage, under 
the non-competitive labor market. Increase in real wage translates into higher disposable 
income of non-Ricardian household, thus increasing their consumption. The sufficient share 
of non-Ricardian households offsets the negative wealth effect and increases the aggregate 
private consumption.  
The importance of rule of thumb consumers was investigated by Coenen and Straub (2005) 
using data for Euro Area. Following Gali et al. Coenen and Straub (2005) supplemented the 
standard New Keynesian model with price stickiness and monopolistic labor market. In 
addition, authors introduced wage stickiness and precise fiscal policy framework. Results 
show that in Euro area share of non-Ricardian households is relatively small and possibility 
for crowding in effect is small due to strong and substantial negative wealth effect. Still, 
Coenen and Straub (2005) state that the role of presence of non-Ricardian households is 
important in the analysis of expansionary fiscal policy effects since the willingness of 
Ricardian households to smooth consumption over time in the absence of rule of thumb 
consumers tend to be lower. 
Gali et al. (2007) state that the assumption of rule of thumb consumers is not enough to 
generate crowding in effect and additional assumptions of sticky price and monopolistic labor 
market are necessary, thus their model highly depends on the response of real wage. While 
empirically, Fatas and Mihov (2001), Coenen and Straub (2005) show that the response of 
real wage to a government spending shock is not sufficiently strong. 
Despite the theoretical predictions, Linnemann and Schabert (2003) modified standard New 
Keynesian model with sticky prices and generated positive effect of government spending on 
private consumption. They proposed to modify household utility function with entering 
government spending. In the combination with sufficiently low elasticity of substitution, 
demand side modification can recoup negative wealth effect. However, the modified model 
and results depends on cooperative monetary policy and in case of it being aggressive, private 
consumption will decrease, as negative wealth effect will prevail. 
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Given the variety of models under both theoretical frameworks, for the purpose of analysis of 
government spending effect on private consumption with data for Norway, the paper will 
employ RBC model, modified by Bouzkez and Rebei (2005). Before analyzing the 
relationship between government spending and private consumption, the next section will 
conduct empirical estimation using VAR model to see the presence of crowding in effect in 
Norway. 
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3 Vector Autoregression Model 
3.1 VAR Methodology 
Before proceeding to neoclassical model description and empirical estimation, the effects of 
government spending shock is investigated using VAR model, which does not require model 
description and explanation of mechanisms used. VAR employs minimal restrictions and 
totally data driven. The advantage to given methodology is that it is appropriate to identify the 
effects of government spending shock and separate the response of regression variables over 
and their transmission over time.  
The paper employs the simple two-lag VAR model of the following form: 
𝕐𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼 𝐿, 𝑦 𝕐𝑡−1 + 𝛽 𝑥𝑡 + 𝕌𝑡 . 
Where 𝕐𝑡 =   𝐿𝑁𝐺𝑆𝑡 ,𝑖 , 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑡 ,𝑖 , 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ,𝑖 , 𝐿𝑁𝑊𝐺𝑡 ,𝑖 , 𝐿𝑁𝐻𝑊𝑡 ,𝑖 , 𝐿𝑁𝐼𝑡 ,𝑖 , or vector with 
endogenous variables. 𝑥𝑡  is vector of exogenous variables and 𝕌𝑡  is a vector of reduced form 
residuals. Variables government spending, private consumption, GDP, hours worked, wage, 
and investment are endogenous and constant term, c, is exogenous variable. Following 
Blanchard and Perroti (2002) and Gali et al. (2007), to identify government spending shock, 
the variable of government spending will be ordered first. The vector representation takes 
following form: 
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3.2 Data Description 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the response of private consumption on increase in 
government spending shocks in three different levels: general government, central 
government and local government. This will allow to decide whether expansionary fiscal 
policy in terms of increase in government spending is effective in stimulation of household`s 
consumption in the scale of state or smaller subdivisions. The whole set of data is taken from 
Statistics Norway. 
This paper exploits quarterly data from 1995K1 to 2014K4 on the following variables: 
LNGS – log value of total general government expenditure, 
LNGSC – log value of total central government expenditure, 
LNGSL – log value of total local government expenditure, 
LNPC – log value of total household expenditure, 
LNGDP – log value of total gross domestic product, 
LNWG – log value of wage compensation in non-farm business sector, 
LNHW – log value of aggregate hours registered in non-farm business sector, 
INI – log value of non-residential investment. 
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3.3 VAR: Estimation and Results 
Before running the VAR model and estimating results, the check of data on stationarity have 
to be provided. To check for unit root, the paper employs Augmented Dickey Filter (ADF) 
and Dicky-Fuller Generalized Least Square (DF-GLS) tests. Both tests showed stationarity of 
the data. The results will be presented later in analysis of ARDL model. 
First of all, the test of model stability and serial correlation have to be carried out. To check 
presence of serial correlation among variables the LM test is performed. The results proved 
the absence of serial correlation among government spending, private consumption, GDP, 
hours worked, wage, and investment given two lag VAR. 
Table 1 Serial Correlation Test: VAR 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation 
LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial 
correlation at lag order h 
Date: 10/14/15   Time: 09:47 
Sample: 1995Q1 2014Q4 
Included observations: 78 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  61.89188  0.0046 
2  57.73845  0.0122 
3  37.51627  0.3995 
4  43.34108  0.1868 
5  63.13467  0.0034 
6  44.49723  0.1564 
7  24.38466  0.9294 
8  44.11286  0.1661 
9  30.19208  0.7407 
10  43.02518  0.1957 
11  28.42917  0.8116 
12  24.00261  0.9370 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 36 df. 
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To check stability of the VAR model, the inverse roots have to is revised by AR Roots Graph, 
which illustrates that estimated VAR model is stable. 
 
Figure 1 Dynamic Stability Test: VAR 
Figure 2 displays the estimated impulse responses on general government spending shock.  
The response of general government spending is significant and persistent starting from 
second quarter after shock. Private consumption is shown to decrease at the beginning, but 
starting from second quarter shown to have drastic ups and downs, so the response of private 
consumption is not smooth over the time. However, general government spending crowds in 
private consumption in the long-run perspective, which is consistent with Keynesian 
framework and modified neoclassical and New-Keynesian models. The effect of central 
government spending shock on private consumption is very similar to the estimated effect of 
general government spending and. However, the local government spending significantly 
crowds out private consumption. Thus, based on VAR estimations, general and central 
government can use government spending as private consumption stimulation tool. 
The positive response of private consumption may account for sharp increase in hours worked 
starting from second quarter after shock combined with estimated rise in wage starting from 
second quarter. Thus, substitution effect offsets negative wealth effect after second quarter. 
These results are consistent with Keynesian and neoclassical theoretical frameworks. 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
15 
 
 
Figure 2 VAR Impulse Response Graphs: General Government  
 
Interestingly, the estimated response of GDP is inconsistent with theory and negative up to 
fourth quarter and shows relatively small positive effect after. This may be caused by 
significant decrease in private investment combined with short-term decrease in private 
consumption. 
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Figure 3 VAR Impulse Response Graphs: Central Government 
 
Figure 4 VAR Impulse Response Graphs: Local Government 
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4 Model and Application 
4.1 Modified RBC model by Bouakez and Rebei 
This section briefly introduces the modified standard RBC model presented by Bouakez and 
Rebei (2005). Distinct features of the model include utility specification allowing government 
spending influence directly utility, and households’ habit formation.  
The model assumes an economy, which is inhabited by infinitely lived Ricardian 
representative households, whose utility depends on leisure and effective consumption. 
Bouakez and Rebei (2005) describe effective consumption as constant elasticity of 
substitution index of private consumption and government spending, having the following 
structure: 
𝒵𝑡 = [𝜙𝐶𝑡
 𝜐−1 
𝜐 +  1 − 𝜙 𝐺𝑡
 𝜐−1 
𝜐 ]
𝜐
(𝜐−1) , 
where: 
o (𝒵) = Effective consumption 
o (C) = Private consumption 
o (G) = Government spending 
o (𝜙) = Portion of private consumption in the effective consumption 
index 
o (𝜐) = Elasticity of substitution among private consumption and 
government spending 
In case when υ→∞, government spending and private consumption are perfect substitutes and 
as υ=0, they become prefect compliments. Since ϕ∈[0,1], government spending becomes 
insubstantial in building effective consumption as ϕ=1, preferences of households depend on 
current level of consumption only and utility function takes it standard form. 
Under the habit formation, the household’s preferences depend on current level of effective 
consumption and leisure, (1- N), and instant utility function takes the following form: 
𝓊 𝒵𝑡 , 𝒵𝑡−1, 𝑁𝑡 =  
1
1 − 𝜖
(𝒵𝑡 𝒵𝑡−1
𝛾 )1−𝜖 + 𝜓 ln 1 − 𝑁𝑡 , 
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where: 
o (𝑁𝑡) = Number of hours worked in period t 
o (𝛾) = Habit formation degree 
o (𝜖 > 0) and (𝜓 > 0) = Numerical parameters 
 
Households acquire disposable income by renting labor and capital to firms and allocate it 
between consumption and investment decisions. By investing part of disposable income, 
households increase capital stock, which diminish in value over time, by: 
𝐾𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡 +  𝐼𝑡 , 
where: 
o (𝐾𝑡) = Capital stock at period t 
o (𝐼𝑡) = Investment at period t 
o (𝛿) = Capital depreciation rate, 𝛿 ∈ (0,1) 
 
Investment increases future income through growth in capital stock, but at period t it requires 
adjustment costs of the form: 
𝜑 𝐼𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡 =  
𝜅
2
(
𝐼𝑡
𝐾𝑡
−  𝛿)2𝐾𝑡 , 
where 𝜅 > 0 is numerical parameter. Also household pays lump-sum tax to 
government, which covers government spending entirely. Thus, 𝐺𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡 . 
Summing up total saving-spending decisions, household’s budget constraint in period t 
is 
𝐶𝑡 +  𝐼𝑡 +  𝜑 𝐼𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡 ≤  𝓌𝑡𝑁𝑡 +  𝓇𝑡𝐾𝑡 −  𝑇𝑡 , 
where: 
(𝓌𝑡) = Real wage 
(𝓇𝑡) = Real capital rental rate 
(𝑇𝑡) = Lump-sum tax 
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Household’s decision problem is to maximize their life-time utility: 
𝕌𝑡 =  𝐸𝑡  𝛽
𝑠−𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡
𝓊 𝒵𝑠 , 𝒵𝑠−𝑡 , 𝑁𝑠 , 
subject to effective consumption, capital stock accumulation, investment adjustment cost and 
budget constraint. Marginal utility of consumption, first order condition associated with 
optimal choice of C_t derived as the following form: 
𝜆𝑡 =  𝜙(𝒵𝑡 𝐶𝑡 )
1
𝜈   1 𝒵𝑡−1
𝛾   𝒵𝑡 𝒵𝑡−1
𝛾  
−𝜖
− 𝛽𝛾𝐸𝑡  𝒵𝑡+1 𝒵𝑡
1+𝛾   𝒵𝑡+1 𝒵𝑡
𝛾  
−𝜖
  . 
where〖 λ〗_t is Lagrange multiplier associated with budget constraint, Marginal value of 
capital takes value of: 
𝜆𝑡 =  
𝛽𝐸𝑡{𝜆𝑡+1 [1 + 𝓇𝑡+1 − 𝛿 + 𝜅(𝐼𝑡+1 𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝛿) + (𝜅 2 )(𝐼𝑡+1 𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝛿) 
2
]} 
1 + 𝜅(𝐼𝑡 𝐾𝑡 −  𝛿) 
. 
Marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, equated to real wage derived 
as first order condition associated with optimal choice of𝑁𝑡 ,  
𝜆𝑡 =  𝜓  𝓌𝑡 1 − 𝑁𝑡   . 
The representative firm for the means of production of goods for consumption employs labor 
and capital from households. Production technology takes standard Cobb-Douglas form: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝑁𝑡
1−𝛼 , 
where A_t is technology shock. The firms choses the amount of labor and capital to maximize 
the profit and the optimum is characterized by standard conditions and generate input-demand 
equations of following form that shows each part gets its marginal product: 
𝓌𝑡 =
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
= (1 − 𝛼)𝑌𝑡 𝑁𝑡 , 
𝓇𝑡 =
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝐾𝑡
= 𝛼𝑌𝑡 𝐾𝑡 . 
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In order to obtain market clearing conditions, one should substitute input-demand equations 
and government funding condition, 𝐺𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡 , into the budget constraint equation that will yield 
the following resource constraint: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 + 𝜑 𝐼𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡 . 
he economy in this model reaches an equilibrium, which consists of the effective 
consumption, private consumption, government spending, output, investment, stock of 
capital, real wage rate, capital rate, and Lagrange multiplier that satisfy the stated above 
conditions. More information on the model and its implications can be found in the paper of 
Bouakez and Rebei from 2005 “Why does private consumption rise after government 
spending shock?”  
To test the effect of government spending shock on private consumption, using data for 
Norway, the paper extents the model of Bouakez and Rebei (2005) by dividing the 
government expenditures into spending of general government, central government and local 
government. This procedure will allow seeing if expansionary fiscal policy in terms of 
increased government spending will stimulate private consumption on country level or local 
level. 
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4.2 Estimation method: ARDL Model 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model have been used for decades, but it gained wide 
acceptance relatively recently. Pesaran and Shin (1998), Pesaran (2001) popularized ARDL 
by showing its usefulness as very valuable tool for testing long-run relationship between 
economics variables. According to Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran (2001), there are 
several advantages of ARDL model. First of all, it is suitable regardless of interaction order, 
which of I(0) and I(1), however we have to be sure that none of our variables are in I(2). 
Second, ARDL employs a very simple set-up of single equation that makes the process of 
implementation and interpretation very straightforward and smooth. Third, variables can 
contain different lag-length that is not necessarily equal. In addition, considering small sample 
estimations, ARDL gives more robust results. 
The standard ARDL model take following form: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛽𝑗𝕃
𝑗 𝑋𝑡
𝑛
𝑗 =0
+  𝜗𝑖𝕃
𝑖𝑌𝑡
𝑚
𝑖=1
+  𝜀𝑡 . 
The model is called “autoregressive” since the dependent variable,𝑌𝑡 , is partially explained by 
lagged value of itself, 𝕃𝑌𝑡−1. Other than that, it also contains a distributed lag as the 
explanatory variable`s subsequent lag, 𝕃𝑋𝑡 . 𝜀𝑡  is a random disturbance term. We will assume 
it to behave in a usual sense, meaning it to be serially independent. 
 Rearranging RHS and LHS, we will receive:  
 1 −  𝜗𝑖𝕃
𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
 𝑌𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑗𝕃
𝑗 𝑋𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=0
 +  𝜀𝑡 . 
In order to simplify the equation, we have to solve parts of equation on brackets separately. 
The simplification is show in details in Appendix1. After simplification, the model looks like 
this: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0
∗ + Β0
∗𝑋𝑡 + Β𝑗
∗∆𝑋𝑡−𝑗+1 + Φ𝑗
∗∆𝑌𝑡−𝑗+1 + 𝜀𝑡
∗. 
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Moreover, the equation can be rewritten in the more friendly way: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝜗𝑖𝑌𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+  𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗 =0
+ 𝜀𝑦 , 
where: 
𝐶 𝐿 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝐵 𝕃 𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
𝐶 𝐿 = 1 − 𝜗1𝕃 − 𝜗2𝐿
2 − ⋯− 𝜗𝑛𝕃
𝑛 , 
𝐵 𝐿 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝕃 + 𝛽2𝕃
2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑚𝕃
𝑚 . 
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4.3 Estimation Analysis and Results: ARDL Model 
4.3.1 General Government Level 
To test the effect of general government spending on private consumption, the following 
regression model was estimated: 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝐶 = ℱ 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝑆, 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝐿𝑁𝐻𝑊, 𝐿𝑁𝐼, 𝐿𝑁𝑊 . 
Before proceeding to model estimation, we have to be sure that none of our variables are in 
I(2), so it is necessary to check the series for unit-root. In this purpose, Augmented Dickey 
Filter (ADF) and Dicky-Fuller Generalized Least Square (DF-GLS) tests carried out. ADF 
test results showed consistent results of unit-root presence in variables in both cases: when 
with and without trend, (t), which means that variables are integrated in I(1). However, DF-
GLS test rejected “H0: LNGDP, LNHW, LNI have a unit-root” in presence of trend as 
exogenous variable. Nevertheless, in case without trend the DF-GLS test confirmed that 
variables have unit-root. Considering the results of both test, trend will not be included in the 
ARDL model specification to estimate the effects of government spending. 
Table 2 Stationarity Tests on First Difference 
VARIABLES  ADF DF-GLS  
 c, 0 c, t c, 0 c, t 
LNPC -1.8 (0.3) -1.2 (0.9) 0.43 (0.6) -0.5 (0.6) 
LNGS -1.3 (0.6) -2.3 (0.4) 0.203 (0.8) -2.86 (0.1) 
LNGDP -1.2 (0.6) -2.9 (0.1) 0.6 (0.5) -2.89 (0.005) 
LNHW -2.03 (0.2) -3.5 (0.04) -0.78 (0.4) -3.46 (0.0009) 
LNI -3.03 (0.8) -3.03 (0.1) 0.89 (0.3) -2.91 (0.0048) 
LNW -0.88 (0.7) -4.06 (0.01) 0.52 (0.6) -2.32 (0.02) 
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Since the variables are stationary, unrestricted” error correction (ECM) is formulated as 
particular type of ARDL model: 
∆𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑖∆𝑃𝐶𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=1
+  𝛾𝑗∆𝐺𝑆𝑡−𝑗
𝑛
𝑗 =0
+  𝛿𝑘∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=0
+  𝜎𝑟∆𝐼𝑡−𝑟
𝑛
𝑟=0
+  𝜈𝑝∆𝐻𝑊𝑡−𝑝
𝑛
𝑝=0
+  𝜄𝑞∆𝑊𝐺𝑡−𝑞
𝑛
𝑞=0
+ 𝜃0𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝜃1𝐺𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
+ 𝜃3𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜃4𝐻𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝜃5𝑊𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 . 
Where 𝑃𝐶𝑡−1, 𝐺𝑆𝑡−1, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1, 𝐼𝑡−1, 𝐻𝑊𝑡−1, 𝑊𝐺𝑡−1 are used as error correction terms. Thenext 
step in our analysis is to set the appropriate numbers of lags. Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) 
criterions are used to select number of lags among 2, 4, and 6. Table 3 shows the estimated 
results for different number of lags. Since the smallest number of AIC and SC is belongs to 2 
lags parameter, the maximum number of lags is considered to be 2. 
Table 3 Selected Maximum Lag Base: General Government  
# OF LAGS AIC SC 
2 -4.71 -4.137 
4 -5.5841 -4.6262 
6 -5.6951 -4.346 
 
Next, we have to check for no correlation among the residuals. If we find so, the equation 
have to be reconsidered and rearranged. To check it the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation 
LM Test is applied with null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals up to the 
specified order,. The results of LM test report that there is no evidence that null hypothesis 
can be rejected, but rather accept it. In other words, there is no serial correlation in the 
residuals up to second order and the set up estimation regression can be used for hypothesis 
testing and forecasting the response of private consumption on government spending shocks. 
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Table 4 Serial Correlation Test: General Government 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.793467    Prob. F(2,56) 0.4573 
Obs*R-squared 2.121904    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.3461 
     
      
Before proceeding to ARDL Bound Cointegration Test, we have to verify the model`s 
stability, which is checked by Cusum test. The results confirm stability of the model under 
5% significance level. 
 
Figure 5 Dynamic Stability Test: General Government 
At this point, we have verified that none of our variables are involved in I(2), selected best 
fitted lag number, checked for absence of serial correlation, and proved that our model is 
stable. Now, we can proceed to ARDL Bound Cointegration test to check if there is long-run 
cointegration relationship among private consumption, government spending, GDP, hours 
worked, wage, and investment. Wald test is used to estimate long-run cointegration and to 
check the null hypothesis: 
H0:LNPC(-1)=LNGS(-1)=LNGDP(-1)=LNWG(-1)=LNHW(-1)=LNI(-1)=0  
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According to Pesaran et al. (2001), to test the existence of a long-run relationship for our 
model, critical value bounds of F-statistic have to be compared with Wald test F-staistic. 
Under 95%, for five regressors the lower bound is 2.649 and the upper bound is 3.805. As 
stated by Pesaran et al. (2001), if F-statistic is smaller than lower bound, then there is no long-
run cointegration relationship among the tested variables. If F-statistic is greater than upper 
bound, then there is cointegration and long-term relationship among estimated variables. If F-
statistic falls in between of lower and upper bounds, then the results are inconclusive and 
different method is required. 
Table 5 presents the estimated results of Wald test. The estimated F-statistic is 4.13>3.805, 
which shows moderately strong evidence that null hypothesis does not hold. It means there is 
long-run cointegration relationship between variables and we can estimate coefficients of 
private consumption, government spending, GDP, hours worked, wage, and investment using 
Error Correction Model (ECM). 
Table 5 Presence of Long Run Relationship Test: General Government 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    F-statistic  4.138034 (6, 58)  0.0325 
Chi-square  12.82820  6  0.0458 
    
     
The final step is to run ECM: 
∆𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑖∆𝑃𝐶𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=1
+  𝛾𝑗∆𝐺𝑆𝑡−𝑗
𝑛
𝑗 =0
+  𝛿𝑘∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=0
+  𝜎𝑟∆𝐼𝑡−𝑟
𝑛
𝑟=0
+  𝜈𝑝∆𝐻𝑊𝑡−𝑝
𝑛
𝑝=0
+  𝜄𝑞∆𝑊𝐺𝑡−𝑞
𝑛
𝑞=0
+ 𝜃0𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝜃1𝐺𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
+ 𝜃3𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜃4𝐻𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝜃5𝑊𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 . 
The results of short-run response of private consumption on regression variables is shown in 
Table 6. Estimated results show negative wealth effect for short period after shock. Moreover, 
they are consistent VAR outcome, when private consumption decreased in first quarter, but 
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after experienced trend of growth. In the short-run, the expansion of general government 
spending will reduce private consumption by 0.06 percent. The effect of GDP on 
consumption is as predicted by both neoclassical and New-Keynesian theories, on average 1 
percent change in GDP will lead to 0.3 percent increase in private consumption.  The same 
positive and consistent with theories effect comes from wage and working hours factors. As it 
comes to investment, then the results negative but statistically insignificant. The regression 
model successively explained 85 percent of private consumption variation. The coefficient of 
ECT, which is equal to 10.9 percent, shows with what speed the system can get to long rung 
equilibrium. 
Table 6 Short Run Coefficients: General Government  
Dependent Variable: D(LNPC)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/13/15   Time: 19:00   
Sample (adjusted): 1995Q4 2014Q4  
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.024822 0.007248 3.424705 0.0011 
D(LNPC(-1)) -0.208951 0.161665 -1.292497 0.2009 
D(LNPC(-2)) -0.303337 0.114118 -2.658101 0.0099 
D(LNGS(-1)) -0.452770 0.131501 -3.443082 0.0010 
D(LNGS(-2)) -0.061858 0.141900 -0.435930 0.0044 
D(LNY(-1)) 0.385660 0.097036 3.974409 0.0002 
D(LNY(-2)) 0.312245 0.106985 2.918577 0.0049 
D(LNW(-1)) 0.513254 0.267162 1.921137 0.0592 
D(LNW(-2)) 0.096876 0.244427 0.396341 0.6932 
D(LNH(-1)) 0.796086 0.150237 5.298868 0.0000 
D(LNH(-2)) 0.230123 0.158040 1.456110 0.1503 
D(LNI(-1)) -0.022694 0.055166 -0.411378 0.6822 
D(LNI(-2)) -0.088038 0.056585 -1.555842 0.1248 
ECT(-1) -0.109422 0.169581 -0.645252 0.5211 
     
     R-squared 0.882966    Mean dependent var 0.013453 
Adjusted R-squared 0.858817    S.D. dependent var 0.057985 
S.E. of regression 0.021787    Akaike info criterion -4.652001 
Sum squared resid 0.029906    Schwarz criterion -4.225855 
Log likelihood 193.1020    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.481546 
F-statistic 36.56208    Durbin-Watson stat 2.264452 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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To finish with short-run analysis, we have to make sure that the absence of serial correlation 
and stability for the short turn. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM and Cusum tests are 
used as previously. The results are presented in Table 7, Figure 6 and verify the absence of 
serial correlation and stability of the ARDL model for short run. 
Table 7 Short-run ECT Correlation Test: General Government 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 5.082800    Prob. F(2,61) 0.091 
Obs*R-squared 10.99901    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.041 
     
      
 
Figure 6 Dynamic Stability Test ECT Test: General Government 
The long-run response of private consumption is fully consistent with both neoclassical and 
New-Keynesian theories. As was predicted by model developed by Bouakez and Rebei 
(2005), positive general government spending shock will increase private consumption by 
0.26 percent. Thus short-term substitution effect, which works through increase in working 
hours, offsets negative wealth effect. The biggest effect on private consumption occurs to 
change in wage variable, which is logically correct since wage increases disposable income of 
households. Negative effect of investment is not consistent with estimated model of Bouakez 
and Rebei (2005), where investment tend to increase consumption through capital 
accumulation. 
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Table 8 Long Run Coefficients: General Government 
Dependent Variable: LNPC   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/13/15   Time: 20:19   
Sample (adjusted): 1995Q2 2014Q4  
Included observations: 79 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.427443 0.777505 -0.549762 0.0052 
LNGS(-1) 0.262370 0.139507 1.880690 0.0240 
LNY(-1) 0.129132 0.081058 1.593090 0.0155 
LNW(-1) 1.273992 0.173226 7.354498 0.0000 
LNH(-1) 0.344413 0.180149 1.911828 0.0498 
LNI(-1) -0.228269 0.058521 -3.900621 0.0002 
     
     R-squared 0.985357    Mean dependent var 12.17217 
Adjusted R-squared 0.984354    S.D. dependent var 0.306802 
S.E. of regression 0.038376    Akaike info criterion -3.609835 
Sum squared resid 0.107511    Schwarz criterion -3.429877 
Log likelihood 148.5885    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.537738 
F-statistic 982.4343    Durbin-Watson stat 1.249945 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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4.3.2 Central and Local Government Level 
The analysis of response of private consumption to an increase in government spending on 
general level, which includes both central and local governments, showed slightly negative 
response in short-run period and sufficiently positive response in the long run that is 
consistent with theory. Expansion of general government spending, which is entirely financed 
by lump-sum taxes, decreases disposable income of households that causes negative wealth 
effect. Thus, households cut private consumption to smooth it over lifetime. However, the 
substitution effect, which makes households work more, thus, increase disposable income, 
rises consumption of households. The empirical estimation of this paper showed that 
substitution effect is greater than negative effect in the long-run, thus private consumption 
positively responses to general government spending shock.  
This part of the empirical analysis will estimate if the positive tendency is maintained on the 
central and local government levels. As in the previous analysis of the private consumption`s 
response to changes in general government spending, the starting point of estimation is to 
check if the central government spending and local government spending variables are not 
involved in I(2). The same procedures of ADF and DF-GLS tests are applied. The results of 
the tests proved that central and local government spending are stationary or have a unit root 
in both cases with and without trend factor. The results are presented in the following Table 9. 
Table 9 Stationarity Test on First Difference: Central and Local Government Spending 
 ADF DF-GLS 
 c,0 c, trend c,0 c, trend 
LNGSC -0.92 (0.7) -1.4 (0.82) 2.17 (0.052) -1.59 (0.1) 
LNGSL -0.5 (0.9) -1.69 (0.74) 2.18 (0.05) -1.74 (0.08) 
 
The particular type of ARDL model, unrestricted ECM, can now be constructed separately for 
each level of government. In case of central government, the estimation equation of 
unrestricted ECM will be following: 
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∆𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑖∆𝑃𝐶𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=1
+  𝛾𝑗∆𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑡−𝑗
𝑛
𝑗 =0
+  𝛿𝑘∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=0
+  𝜎𝑟∆𝐼𝑡−𝑟
𝑛
𝑟=0
+  𝜈𝑝∆𝐻𝑊𝑡−𝑝
𝑛
𝑝=0
+  𝜄𝑞∆𝑊𝐺𝑡−𝑞
𝑛
𝑞=0
+ 𝜃0𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝜃1𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
+ 𝜃3𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜃4𝐻𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝜃5𝑊𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝓏𝑡 . 
where, GSC is central government spending.  
The next step is to define maximum appropriate number of lags using Akaike (AIC) and 
Schwarz (SC) criterions. The number of lags, suggested by both criterions, is two, which is 
the same as in the previous analysis of general government spending. 
Table 10 Selected Maximum Lag Base: Central Government 
# OF LAGS AIC SC 
2 -4.609 -4.031 
4 -5.623 -4.665 
6 -5.406 -4.057 
 
Now, the presence of serial correlation has to be tested by Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation 
LM test. The estimated probability shows that there is no evidence to reject null hypothesis 
rather to accept it. In other words, there is no serial correlation among the variables of 
particular model. The results of LM test can be found in Table 11. 
Table 11 Serial Correlation Test: Central Government 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 4.477250    Prob. F(2,56) 0.0157 
Obs*R-squared 10.61507    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0050 
     
      
To check if the model is dynamically stable, Cusum test is carried out. The test shows the 
stability of the ECM model under 5% significance. The results are presented in the following 
Figure4. Since, the central government spending variable is stationary, the most appropriate 
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number of lags have been selected, the model does not include serial correlation and 
dynamically stabe, we can proceed to Wald test to see if there is long-run correlation among 
private consumption, central government spending, GDP, hours worked, wage, and 
investment and if they jointly affect private consumption. 
 
Figure 7Dynamic Stability: Central Government 
 
To check the long-run causation, the Pesaran et al. (2001) parameters of lower bound and 
upper bound, which are the same as in the previous analysis, are used.  The results of test can 
be found in Table 11. The Wald test estimated F-statistic equal to 3.92, which is greater than 
Pesaran upper bound for five regressors under 95% significance level, 3.805. This means that 
private consumption, government spending, GDP, hours worked, wage, and investment have 
long-run relationship and further estimation of coefficients can be held. 
Table 72 Presence of Lon-Run Relationship: Central Government 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    F-statistic  3.924542 (6, 58)  0.0101 
Chi-square  18.74725  6  0.0046 
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The core of analysis is to check the short-run and long-run coefficients for private 
consumption response. The estimated results for short-run are presented in Table12, for long-
run in Table13. The short-run effect of expansion in central government spending on private 
consumption is positive but small and statistically significant under 10% significance level. 
The long-run results estimated strong and positive statistically significant coefficient of 0.16. 
The rest of the variables follow the logic of the model. Wage and hours factors increase 
disposable income of households, which will rise private consumption. Increase in output will 
stimulate economy, thus increasing the level of consumption. As for the investment, it will 
generate increase in private consumption through capital accumulation.  
The analysis of effects of local government spending shocks, based on the ECM of particular 
type:  
∆𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑖∆𝑃𝐶𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=1
+  𝛾𝑗∆𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑡−𝑗
𝑛
𝑗 =0
+  𝛿𝑘∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=0
+  𝜎𝑟∆𝐼𝑡−𝑟
𝑛
𝑟=0
+  𝜈𝑝∆𝐻𝑊𝑡−𝑝
𝑛
𝑝=0
+  𝜄𝑞∆𝑊𝐺𝑡−𝑞
𝑛
𝑞=0
+ 𝜃0𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝜃1𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
+ 𝜃3𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜃4𝐻𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝜃5𝑊𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝓏𝑡 . 
involves the same logic. Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test and Cusum stability 
check proved the absence of serial correlation and dynamically stability of the particular 
model for the local government level. Wald test generated F-statistic equal to 12.22, which is 
greater that 3.805 (Pesaran et al., 2001). The Tables and Figures for analysis of local 
government spending are presented in Appendix 2. We proceed directly to the short-run and 
long-run coefficients analysis. 
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The short-run estimated coefficient of local government spending is negative and statistically 
significant for lag1. The coefficients of GDP and wage factor is estimated to be positive and 
statistically significant. The hours worked and investment coefficients estimated to be 
negative and statistically insignificant in lag1. The long-run estimates coefficient of local 
government spending is negative and statistically insignificant, meaning that the estimated 
regression failed to estimate the effect of local government spending on private consumption. 
The coefficients of the rest of the variable are positive and statistically significant, among 
which the greatest influence is generated by wage factor. 
Table 83 Short-Run Coefficients: Central Government 
Dependent Variable: D(LNPC)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/13/15   Time: 21:56   
Sample (adjusted): 1996Q1 2014Q4  
Included observations: 76 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.000914 0.006253 -0.146217 0.8842 
D(LNPC(-1)) 0.380257 0.164215 2.315608 0.0239 
D(LNPC(-2)) -0.045519 0.110874 -0.410549 0.0628 
D(LNGSC(-1)) 0.026137 0.069782 0.374562 0.0493 
D(LNGSC(-2)) 0.060961 0.067475 0.903466 0.3698 
D(LNY(-1)) -0.300241 0.089334 -3.360879 0.0013 
D(LNY(-2)) 0.597361 0.120639 4.951620 0.0000 
D(LNW(-1)) 1.001388 0.238106 4.205646 0.0001 
D(LNW(-2)) -0.754428 0.262800 -2.870731 0.0056 
D(LNH(-1)) 0.255158 0.155833 1.637386 0.1066 
D(LNH(-2)) -0.989142 0.205392 -4.815882 0.0000 
D(LNI(-1)) 0.026676 0.051619 0.516779 0.6071 
D(LNI(-2)) -0.102409 0.052037 -1.968007 0.0535 
ECTC(-1) -1.086057 0.236069 -4.600594 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.898006    Mean dependent var 0.012564 
Adjusted R-squared 0.876620    S.D. dependent var 0.057840 
S.E. of regression 0.020316    Akaike info criterion -4.789952 
Sum squared resid 0.025591    Schwarz criterion -4.360606 
Log likelihood 196.0182    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.618365 
F-statistic 41.99061    Durbin-Watson stat 1.842519 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 94 Long-Run Coefficients: Central Government 
Dependent Variable: LNPC   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/13/15   Time: 22:47   
Sample: 1995Q1 2014Q4   
Included observations: 80   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.350106 0.706207 1.911771 0.0598 
LNGSC 0.163847 0.045070 3.635368 0.0005 
LNY 0.281521 0.074038 3.802377 0.0003 
LNW 0.232464 0.097330 2.388407 0.0195 
LNH 0.311853 0.164202 1.899200 0.0614 
LNI 0.128478 0.051653 2.487350 0.0151 
     
     R-squared 0.988375    Mean dependent var 12.16443 
Adjusted R-squared 0.987589    S.D. dependent var 0.312622 
S.E. of regression 0.034827    Akaike info criterion -3.804795 
Sum squared resid 0.089757    Schwarz criterion -3.626143 
Log likelihood 158.1918    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.733169 
F-statistic 1258.290    Durbin-Watson stat 2.101216 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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4.3.3 Limitations 
Even if the estimated in this paper response of private consumption is consisted with 
Keynesian theory and modified RBC model by Bouakez and Rebei (2005), the analysis is 
rough and on average. The real economy operation is way more complicated and includes 
many more variables and implications. For example, the model estimated in this paper does 
not include variables as disposable income, taxes and financial market and labor market 
conditions that influence the behavior of household in consumption decision (Gali et al., 
2007) Next limitation can be data processing, which is differs from Bouakez and Rebei 
(2005) analysis. As one of the limitation can be considered the assumptions employed in the 
paper. Household`s utility may not be effective and may not depend on government spending, 
rather it may depend of number of factor as lifetime income, access to financial market etc. 
Another limitation of the analysis provided in the paper, may be inappropriate model to study 
the effects of local government spending expansion. Thus, there questions are left of further 
studies and discussions. 
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5 Conclusion 
This paper studies the response of private consumption on increase in government spending in 
case of Norway by applying the modified RBC model by Bouakez and Rebei (2005). In 
addition, the paper considers government spending on three scale levels: general, central and 
local government expenditures. The results of the paper proves the presence of crowding in 
effect in scale of general government for long-run period, having small decrease in the short-
run, which is consistent with theory and model. The results of VAR estimation for general 
government spending completely match the estimated results of ARDL model. For central 
government spending, the response of private consumption is positive, small for short-run and 
strong for long run. While VAR estimation for central government spending predicts small 
decline in the first quarter, but sufficient increase after second quarter. However, the response 
of private consumption on increase in local government spending is estimated to be negative 
both for short-run and long run periods. The negative results may arise due to inappropriate 
method to estimate local government spending expansion. The results match with VAR 
estimation, where private consumption`s respond is negative and persistent. The estimated 
negative results are consistent with neoclassical theoretical framework. Thus, fiscal policy 
stimulation through expansion in government spending turns to be effective and generate 
crowding in effect only for country level, while for lower scale it may cause drastic decrease 
in private consumption causing crowding out effect. 
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Appendix 2 
Table 105 Serial Correlation Test: Local Government 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 4.884109    Prob. F(2,56) 0.0111 
Obs*R-squared 11.43642    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0033 
     
      
 
Figure 8 Dynamic Stability Test: Local Government 
 
Table 116 Presence of Long Run Relationship: Local Government 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    F-statistic  12.22126 (6, 58)  0.0536 
Chi-square  13.32760  6  0.0381 
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Table 127 Short Run ECTL Correlation Test: Local Government 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 1.265788    Prob. F(2,60) 0.2894 
Obs*R-squared 3.076843    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.2147 
     
      
 
Figure 9 Dynamic Stability Test ECTL: Local Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 138 Short Run Coefficient: Local Government 
Dependent Variable: D(LNPC)   
Method: Least Squares   
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Date: 10/13/15   Time: 22:38   
Sample (adjusted): 1996Q1 2014Q4  
Included observations: 76 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.004955 0.005780 0.857211 0.3946 
D(LNPC(-1)) 0.282135 0.157921 1.786555 0.0789 
D(LNPC(-2)) -0.145874 0.113097 -1.289811 0.2019 
D(LNGSL(-1)) -0.073895 0.063401 -1.165523 0.0483 
D(LNGSL(-2)) 0.113483 0.064921 1.748001 0.0854 
D(LNY(-1)) -0.288282 0.091389 -3.154442 0.0025 
D(LNY(-2)) 0.545442 0.116687 4.674389 0.0000 
D(LNW(-1)) 0.882634 0.232849 3.790581 0.0003 
D(LNW(-2)) -0.717677 0.257401 -2.788164 0.0070 
D(LNH(-1)) 0.372282 0.157126 2.369318 0.0209 
D(LNH(-2)) -0.870568 0.200244 -4.347535 0.0001 
D(LNI(-1)) 0.019743 0.051072 0.386565 0.7004 
D(LNI(-2)) -0.099196 0.051829 -1.913899 0.0603 
ECTL(-1) -0.911131 0.215947 -4.219245 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.899063    Mean dependent var 0.012564 
Adjusted R-squared 0.877898    S.D. dependent var 0.057840 
S.E. of regression 0.020211    Akaike info criterion -4.800367 
Sum squared resid 0.025326    Schwarz criterion -4.371022 
Log likelihood 196.4140    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.628780 
F-statistic 42.48017    Durbin-Watson stat 1.819149 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table 19  Long Run Coefficients: Local Government 
Dependent Variable: LNPC   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/13/15   Time: 22:42   
Sample: 1995Q1 2014Q4   
Included observations: 80   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.531879 0.718559 0.740202 0.4615 
LNGSL -0.085235 0.064788 -1.315603 0.1924 
LNY 0.360382 0.076024 4.740368 0.0000 
LNW 0.530387 0.113664 4.666274 0.0000 
LNH 0.270621 0.175829 1.539118 0.1280 
LNI 0.043979 0.048813 0.900958 0.3705 
     
     R-squared 0.986612    Mean dependent var 12.16443 
Adjusted R-squared 0.985707    S.D. dependent var 0.312622 
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S.E. of regression 0.037375    Akaike info criterion -3.663594 
Sum squared resid 0.103370    Schwarz criterion -3.484942 
Log likelihood 152.5438    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.591967 
F-statistic 1090.642    Durbin-Watson stat 1.942502 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
 
 
 
